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FOREWORD
ANDREW E. TASLITZ*
The title of this symposium, “The Death of Probable Cause,” overstates the
case, for “probable cause” is, of course, not dead.1 Nor is this fundamental legal
concept ever likely to pass entirely from the constitutional scene. (Perhaps a
better title would therefore add a question mark: “The Death of Probable
Cause?”) But probable cause is on the ropes. Its scope of application is
narrowing, its meaning mutating, its competitors thriving, starving it of
resources.2 Why is this so? Is it a good or a bad thing for the health of the
republic? What does it, and, equally importantly, what should it, mean for the
future of the Fourth Amendment and its statutory progeny? These are the
questions this symposium seeks to answer.
I
PROBABLE CAUSE’S CHANGING MEANING
But no answer can be forthcoming without first understanding just what
probable cause is. The concept of “probable cause” has four components: (1)
one quantitative—how convinced must the fact finder be? (2) one qualitative—
how trustworthy must be the evidence upon which the judgment is made? (3)
* Professor, Howard University School of Law; Immediate Past Welsh S. White Distinguished
Visiting Professor of Law, The University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 200809; former Assistant
District Attorney, Philadelphia, PA.; J.D., 1981, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 1978,
Queens College.
1. See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, MARGARET L. PARIS & LENESE HERBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 186–97 (4th ed. 2010) (summarizing the current state of federal constitutional
law, which often at least purports to require probable cause for full-blown searches or seizures).
2. For example, there are now so many “exceptions” to the occasionally stated rule that probable
cause is presumptively required for Fourth Amendment searches and seizures that the “rule” itself
rarely applies. See id. at 323–39 (discussing the stop-and-frisk exception to the probable-cause rule); id.
at 382–467 (discussing the vehicle, search incident to arrest, plain view, protective sweep,
administrative, and border-search exceptions, among others, to the probable-cause rule). At other
times, the Court inconsistently but flatly denies that there is any such rule, seeing whether probable
cause or some alternative to it is required as merely a question of “reasonableness”—largely of
balancing state against individual interests—without any presumption at work. See New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339–40 (1985). Several decades ago, the Court subtly changed its language in
defining probable cause from that of probability to that of a mere “substantial chance,” Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 243–44 n.13 (1983), and, in the view of many scholars, thereby reduced the quantitative
requirement for probable cause. More recently, according to several commentators, in Maryland v.
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003), the Court further reduced probable cause’s quantitative meaning while
also diluting its requirement that it involve truly “individualized” determinations. See Tracey Maclin,
The Pringle Case’s New Notion of Probable Cause: An Assault on Di Re and the Fourth Amendment,
2003–2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 395, 409–15 (2004) (discussing dilution of the individualized-suspicion
requirement); Andrew E. Taslitz & Margaret L. Paris, Catering to the Constable: The Court’s Latest
Fourth Amendment Cases Give the Nod to the Police, 19 CRIM. J. 5 (2004) (discussing quantitative
lowering).
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one moral—is the evidence sufficiently individualized? and (4) one temporal—
when must the judgment be made? The meaning of each of these components
has been changing, a change accelerating in the past few years.
A. The Quantitative Component
Although it is hard to describe standards of proof like that embodied in the
phrase “probable cause” in purely mathematical terms,3 judges and scholars
have long found rough mathematical approximations of the standard useful.
Thus, for several decades, most judges understood probable cause’s quantitative
requirement to hover around a preponderance of the evidence, usually falling
slightly under fifty-percent confidence that a particular person did the crime or
that evidence of crime would be found in a specific location.4 Surveys of judges
confirmed this fact,5 leading scholars like Wayne LaFave found it to be
consistently evidenced in lower-court opinions,6 and the United States Supreme
Court’s admittedly vague definition of the term fostered this understanding.7
No more. Just two terms ago, the high Court decided a case, Maryland v.
Pringle,8 widely (though not universally) interpreted as meaning that probable
cause’s quantitative requirement has now fallen, at least in some instances, to
about thirty-three percent, rather than just under a fifty-percent, confidence
level.9 Alternatively, Pringle might mean that probable cause has no fixed
quantitative meaning, its meaning instead changing based upon circumstances, a
meaning that can, however, fall to a level so low as to be equivalent to what
used to be considered the hallmark of the less-muscular concept of “reasonable
suspicion,” that is, about a one-third likelihood of guilt.10
If this latter interpretation is correct, however, the Court has given no
guidance for determining when the standard of proof should be lowered. The
judgment for now seems to be left to the discretion of lower courts and law
enforcement, both of whom generally avoid expressly confronting what

3. The Court indeed insists that probable cause is a “fluid,” “nontechnical” concept that cannot
be reduced to any simplistic or rigid formula, whether quantitative or otherwise. Pringle, 540 U.S. at
370–71 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232).
4. See C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or
Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1307—07 (1982).
5. See id. at 1327.
6. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD ISRAEL & NANCY KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.3, at 144–
45 (4th ed. 2004).
7. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 235–39.
8. See Pringle, 540 U.S. 366.
9. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 1, at 187–92.
10. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 7.1(c)-(d) (4th ed. 2009); McCauliff, supra note 4, at 1332 (“The most common complaint was that
percentages are misleading because burdens of proof deal with qualitative judgments rather than
quantitative judgments.”); id. at 1309–10 (describing reasonable suspicion as a traditionally lower
standard than probable cause).
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standard of proof they are using anyway.11 Furthermore, if the quantitative
requirement for probable cause has been lowered, at least in some cases, then
surely the quantitative requirement for reasonable suspicion has also been
lowered. Moreover, if that requirement can rise and fall based upon
circumstances for both concepts, then what, exactly, is it that distinguishes
“probable cause” from “reasonable suspicion” in the first place? In any event,
lower courts and commentators seem to be finding in Pringle a signal that their
degree of confidence in suspecting crime before searching or seizing can decline
with no retribution likely from the Supreme Court.12
B. The Qualitative Requirement
The high Court has also long made it clear that probable cause cannot be
based on mere hunches or suspicions.13 Nor can it be based upon simple
deference to the officer’s judgment.14 Rather, there must be specifically
identified supporting evidence to allow a reviewing magistrate to make an
independent judgment that such support is trustworthy.15 The trustworthiness of
the supporting-evidence inquiry has been most thoroughly discussed in the
context of informants’ tips.16 Initially, the Court used a robust “two-pronged”
test requiring that any informants’ tip must be from a “credible” (truthful)
informant based upon “reliable” information,17 such as personally observing,
rather than just hearing rumors about, a drug transaction.18 This was a
conjunctive rule of inadmissibility: any tip not meeting both prongs was
effectively inadmissible, that is, could not even be considered in the probablecause determination.19 In the 1980s, however, the Court transformed this
inadmissibility rule into one of weight.20 Weakness in one prong or the other
might be relevant in determining how much weight to give a tip, but the tip
would always be considered in the probable-cause determination as part of the
“totality of the circumstances.”21 Combined with a new, highly deferential
standard of review of the magistrate’s finding of probable cause, ever-less-

11. See generally Crosby v. Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1332–34 (11th Cir. 2004); Horton v.
Williams, 572 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1299–1302 (M.D. Ala. 2008).
12. See Crosby, 394 F.3d at 1332–34; Horton, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1299–1303; TASLITZ, PARIS &
HERBERT, supra note 1, at 186–96.
13. See PETER HENNING ET AL., MASTERING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 41–45 (2010) (describing
probable cause as an objective standard and the Court’s application of it).
14. See id.
15. See id. at 45.
16. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983) (articulating the Court’s “totality of the
circumstances” test for the trustworthiness of informants’ tips as a basis for probable cause).
17. E.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 412–13 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114–
15 (1964).
18. See HENNING ET AL., supra note 13, at 51–52 (explaining the Aguilar–Spinelli test).
19. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 1, at 200–15 (discussing the Gates totality-of-thecircumstances test).
20. See id. at 197–215.
21. See id.; see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 233; HENNING ET AL., supra note 13, at 52.
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trustworthy evidence has been declared adequate to support the probable-cause
determination.22 In recent years, again in the context of informants, this race to
the bottom has quickened. An empirical study of warrants issued near the end
of the twentieth century in San Diego, California, reported some surprising
results.23 Magistrates were routinely approving warrants based upon boilerplate
language relying on confidential informants.24 The boilerplate would recite the
officer’s judgment that the confidential informant (CI) is trustworthy but that it
would be dangerous to the informant to report many details that might
inadvertently reveal his identity.25 Accordingly, the warrant applications
revealed little detail about the informants’ credibility or reliability. The word of
the officer was enough.26 The practice of warrant-approval in San Diego thus
seemed to tolerate far less-trustworthy evidence than even the Supreme Court’s
flexible standard permits.27 The willingness of magistrates to countenance weak
applications also means that, even when appellate courts agree that probable
cause is lacking, often no evidence will be suppressed on the theory that the
officers acted in “good faith” reliance on the magistrate’s judgment.28
But there was more. There were extreme racial disparities in the choice of
search targets and in the apparent accuracy of the underlying information.29 The
vast bulk of warrants were directed at African Americans or Hispanics.30 Yet
error rates were high; that is, many searches done of racial-minority-group
members did not yield evidence of the crime for which the warrant was issued
or evidence indeed of any crime at all.31 On the other hand, searches of whites’
homes, cars, and businesses, though far fewer in number (but still large enough

22. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328–31 (1990) (applying the Gates test and finding an
anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated to supply the required reasonable suspicion); see also
Gates, 462 U.S. at 289–90 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (predicting such consequences for the Court’s
jettisoning of Aguilar–Spinnelli and replacing it with the more flexible Gates test); accord 3 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 7.1 (c) (4th ed. 2004) (describing the Court’s recent decision in
Pringle thus: “[T]he Court has made a good many leaps in logic in concluding there was probable cause
that the occupants of the vehicle consisted not only of a ‘dealer’ of drugs but also others who had been
‘admit [ted]’ to the ‘enterprise’ of drug dealing.”); Maclin, supra note 2, at 425–26 (describing the Court
in Pringle as accepting a weak “evidentiary basis” for its finding of probable cause).
23. Laurence A. Benner, Racial Disparity in Narcotics Search Warrants, 6 J.GENDER, RACE, &
JUST. 183 (2002); Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. Samarkos, Searching for Narcotics in San Diego:
Preliminary Findings from the San Diego Search Warrant Project, 36 CAL. WESTERN. L. REV. 221
(2000).
24. See Benner & Samarkos, supra note 23, at 239–40.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 266.
27. See id. at 265–66.
28. The “good faith” exception of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule prevents the
suppression of evidence seized pursuant to a faulty warrant if it is determined that the evidence was
discovered in “objectively reasonable,” good-faith reliance on the search warrant. See Andrew E.
Taslitz, The Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule, 76 MISS. L.J. 483 (2006) (discussing the effects and implication of the “good faith” exception).
29. See Benner, Racial Disparity, supra note 23, at 215, 219–20.
30. Id. at 215–17.
31. Id. at 219–20.
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to support statistically valid conclusions), had high accuracy rates.32 One fair
reading of the data is this: police are more willing to seek, and judges more
willing to approve, warrants directed at racial minorities that are based on
questionable tips than is the case for white suspects.33 Differences in offending
rates did not explain these disparities.34 Rather, fewer whites were searched, or
at least this is arguably so, because law enforcement and the judiciary required
more-trustworthy evidence than was true with racial minorities to justify
interfering with whites’ rights to privacy, property, and freedom of movement.35
There is reason to believe that San Diego, which boasts one of the more
progressive police departments in the country, is likely doing better in judging
trustworthiness than are most other jurisdictions.36 Moreover, numerous cases
have been documented throughout the country of police relying on nonexistent
informants, informants with sorry track records, and informants with powerful
reasons to lie, flaws that a more vibrant requirement of warrant-affidavit
specificity about the tips’ trustworthiness might have revealed, preventing
approval of such bad warrants.37 In a number of cases, there is strong reason to
believe that a CI’s tip prodded police into tunnel vision about who did a crime,
leading to convictions of the innocent, even though the CI, in order to protect
his identity, never testified.38
C. The Moral Requirement
The moral requirement of probable cause is that it involves individualized
suspicion—suspicion based on the thoughts, actions, character, and history of
this individual rather than upon stereotypes, assumptions, averages, or group
membership.39 We refer to this requirement as a “moral one” in the sense that it
can be seen as an aspect of the political morality underlying the probable-cause
concept—the idea that in a republic each of us should be judged for what we do
as individuals, not for who our associates are; nor for what groups we are born
into, or find ourselves thrust into; nor for what others assume about us from our

32. Id. at 187, 221.
33. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux: How Race Contributes to Convicting the
Innocent: The Informants’ Example, 37 SW. L. REV. 1091, 1126–27 (2008). See generally id. at 1124–31
(analyzing Professor Laurence A. Benner’s data gathered in the San Diego Search Warrant Project).
34. See id. at 1126–28.
35. See id.
36. See SAN FRANCISCO POLICE COMMISSION, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 78 (2007) (claiming to
promote progressive policies through community policing); see also Benner& Samarkos, supra note 23,
at 223 (“Overall, this article reports findings which generally show San Diego law enforcement in a
favorable light.”).
37. See AM. BAR ASS’N, ACHIEVING JUSTICE 63–78 (2006); ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF,
SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 69–72 (2009).
38. See Taslitz, supra note 33, at 1134–35.
39. See HENNING ET AL., supra note 13, at 59.
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social position or appearance, but rather what they know of us.40 This principle
recognizes that being arrested, stopped, or searched is a humiliating,
stigmatizing event to which none of us should be subject without bringing
suspicion fairly upon ourselves by our own actions.41 The principle is one that
restrains governmental intervention into our private lives absent strong
justification, while protecting individual dignity.42 It is also an aspiration that
protects freedom of association and speech, for our mere connection with
political groups or positions cannot justify government action against us.43 It is a
principle that, in word, the Court repeatedly reaffirms in glowing, noble terms,
recognizing it as one of the hallmarks of what makes the American republic a
great one.44
But indeed the story is a different one. The Court increasingly finds
“individualized” suspicion in assumptions about the neighborhood where one
lives,45 about the political groups one joins, about the associates with whom one
has only the most tenuous social connection.46 It has even branded mere travel
to and from one state—Florida—as indicative of an individual’s involvement
with crime, specifically, in the drug trade.47 The Court has found mere presence
in a car with another who has engaged in criminal activity to be sufficient to cast
doubt on the honesty of a traveler.48 The Court has also indirectly endorsed
“profiling”—matching the descriptions of supposed “average” criminal
offenders of a certain type without ever inquiring into empirical support for
such generalizations, support that is routinely lacking, and relying instead on
inherently contradictory assumptions.49 Furthermore, though not doing so
explicitly, by declaring inquiry into officers’ subjective racial bias irrelevant
under the Fourth Amendment and hinting that disparate racial impact will be
similarly irrelevant, the Court has opened the door to racial profiling’s nosing
its head into the constitutional tent without fear of being molested by the
judiciary.50 Lower courts, once again, have taken the Court’s cue.51
40. See Andrew E. Taslitz, What is Probable Cause, and Why Should We Care?: The Costs,
Benefits, and Meaning of Individualized Suspicion, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 176-77 (Summer
2010).
41. See Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 124-26
(Summer 2010).
42. See Taslitz, supra note 40, at 209-10.
43. See id. at198-99.
44. Id.
45. Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of the
Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 100 (1999).
46. See Maclin, supra note 2, at 397 (“In a post-Pringle world . . . police have significantly more
authority to arrest a person based on his mere association with others suspected of a crime.”).
47. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 271 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
48. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372–74 (2003).
49. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 1, at 363–69 (summarizing racial-profiling data
and case law).
50. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that racial animus is irrelevant under
the Fourth Amendment); TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 1, at 512–19 (analyzing the role of
racial animus and impact under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
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Statutory changes in the individualized justice requirement have also been
accepted by the courts. Notably, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
requires probable cause to believe that a person is an agent of a foreign power,
not that he has violated any criminal statute.52 Although in the special context of
foreign intelligence, this definition is nevertheless a far cry from traditional
standards of suspicion that a specific individual has engaged in conduct that has
violated some criminal statute.53 In the view of some scholars, material-witness
warrants, which permit arrests of witnesses when there is probable cause to
believe they will not appear in court, are being used as a pretext to arrest
suspects when evidence to prove traditional probable cause is inadequate,
namely, probable cause to believe that those alleged “witnesses” in fact
committed the crime of which they are suspected.54 The Court has also endorsed
“area warrants,” probable cause to believe that civil legal violations are
occurring somewhere in a specific geographic area, thus justifying searches of
homes within that area.55 Scholars have joined the bandwagon, some arguing
that there is no defensible logical difference between “individualized” and
“generalized” suspicion because reasoning without generalization is impossible,
others accepting that there is a difference but arguing that ample empirical and
logical justification supports using generalizations, averages, and group
behavior as bases for suspecting wrongdoing by individuals.56 Some scholars also
endorse the idea of “group” probable cause.57
D. The Temporal Requirement
The Court has periodically stated that, to be reasonable, searches must be
done only via warrants, subject to a few well-recognized, clearly delineated
exceptions.58 Warrants are often justified as moving the probable-cause decision
from the competitive enterprise of law enforcement into the hands of a neutral,

51. See generally TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 1, at 494–95; Sean P. Trende, Why
Modest Proposals Offer the Best Solution for Combating Racial Profiling, 50 DUKE L. J. 331, 342–57
(2000) (summarizing the structural barriers to civil litigation based on alleged violations of Fourth and
related Fourteenth Amendment rights).
52. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No 95-511, § 105(a)(3)(A), 92 Stat. 1783
1790.
53. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 1, at 558.
54. Bradley A. Parker, Abuse of the Material Witness: Suspects Detained as Witnesses in Violation
of the Fourth Amendment, 36 RUTGERS L. REC. 22 (2009) (describing the Federal Material Witness
Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144, and its application before and after 9/11); Carolyn B. Ramsey, In the Sweat
Box: A Historical Perspective on the Detention of Material Witnesses, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 681 (2009)
(describing material witness detention as a longstanding police strategy).
55. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 1, at 418–19; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523 (1967) (striking down a warrantless inspection of a home by a health inspector pursuant to the San
Francisco Housing Code but approving the use of a warrant based solely upon such factors as time
passage, the nature of the building, and the general condition of buildings in the geographic area rather
than requiring individualized suspicion of Code violations in a particular dwelling).
56. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 1, at 86-87.
57. See generally Slobogin, supra note 41.
58. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 1, at 36–37.
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detached magistrate, and as allowing specific descriptions that limit police
discretion in warrant execution.59 But there is another aspect of warrants not
overtly recognized by the Court that affects the definition of probable cause in
the real world: warrants require judges to gauge probable cause before knowing
what, if anything, will be found. Warrants thus avoid the problem of “hindsight
bias.”60 Simply put, if a suppression court reviewing the constitutionality of a
warrantless search knows that the search uncovered the horribly mutilated body
of a torture victim and a kilo of cocaine, it becomes harder for that court to find
that there was no probable cause. That evidence was found suggests that there
was ample reason to believe beforehand that evidence would be found.
Moreover, to suppress evidence of such significant import, perhaps freeing a
very dangerous offender to roam the streets seeking more blood, is a difficult
choice to make. Ample psychological theory and empirical data, albeit mostly in
other contexts, supports the idea that hindsight bias is at work in the probablecause determination.61 In other words, though this happens largely at a
subconscious level, judges deciding whether to approve warrant applications,
not knowing whether any damning evidence will be found, are likely to apply
higher quantitative, qualitative, and moral standards in gauging probable
cause’s existence than if they first make the decision only after evidence of
crime has been found. The more warrantless searches are permitted, therefore,
the weaker the meaning of probable cause.
Yet the Court has enormously expanded the number of exceptions to the
warrant requirement and continues to do so. Warrants are usually not needed
when probable cause to search concerns cars, “regulatory” invasions of
businesses, “frisking” individuals reasonably suspected of carrying weapons,
anyone “voluntarily” consenting to the search, young children or teens in public
schools, or any situation in which there are “exigent circumstances.”62 Warrants
are also usually not needed when probable cause to seize persons or things
concerns brief stops for questioning, full-blown arrests on the street,
impoundment of automobiles, and a host of other circumstances.63 In short,
warrants, not their absence, are becoming the exception rather than the rule.

59. See id. at 237–38; HENNING ET AL., supra note 13, at 66, 212.
60. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 44 (2007).
61. HENNING ET AL., supra note 13, at 46, 62; see generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive
Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998) (summarizing empirical
data).
62. See HENNING ET AL., supra note 13, at 106–07 (stop-and-frisk exception); id. at 138
(automobile-search exception); id. at 153–54 (consent exception); id. at 165–66 (exigent-circumstances
exception); id. at 173–74 (plain-view exception); id. at 179–81 (administrative-search exception).
63. See, e.g., id. at 128–34 (describing searches incident to arrest); id. at 138–40 (searches during
noncustodial traffic stops); id. at 146–51 (impounded-vehicle inventory and vehicle searches generally).
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The Court has routinely seen the warrant and probable-cause requirements as
distinct.64 They are not. The dilution of the former inevitably dilutes the latter.
E. Indirect Assault via the Fifth Amendment
Some alterations in probable cause’s meaning occur without even
mentioning the words “probable cause.” More precisely, loosening the
stringency of the privilege against self-incrimination often sub silentio weakens
probable cause. The Pringle case again offers an example.65 There, an officer
stopping a car with three occupants, one of whom was in the back seat, found a
controlled substance hidden behind an upraised armrest in the back seat. The
officer threatened to arrest all three occupants unless someone confessed to the
crime. When no one admitted guilt, the officer made good on his threats, after
which Pringle, the front-seat passenger, ultimately confessed, exculpating the
other two arrestees. The Court considered the group’s silence in the face of the
officer’s threats as one powerful indicator of criminality contributing to
probable cause to arrest. Threatening to retaliate against silence with arrest
sounds like a classic case of compulsion violating the Fifth Amendment’s
protection against being “compelled” to be a witness against one’s self.66 Yet the
Court saw no Fifth Amendment problem and, in holding silence permissible
grounds for finding probable cause, allowed silence previously presumed to be
constitutionally protected and thus irrelevant to criminality to become its very
hallmark.
II
PROBABLE CAUSE’S SCOPE AND COMPETITORS
A. Narrowed Scope
The Court has continued its drive to narrow the situations in which probable
cause is required. Sometimes the Court finds that the Fourth Amendment does
not govern at all, for example, by applying a thin, counterintuitive notion of
when privacy expectations are “reasonable” (no invasion of a reasonable
expectation of privacy, no search, thus, absent a seizure, no Fourth Amendment

64. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 1, at 380-82 (making general point), 399, 407–08,
411–12 (respectively discussing the “exigent circumstances,” “plain view,” and automobile exceptions
to the warrant requirement, all of which still demand proof of probable cause).
65. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003).
66. Id. at 369 (despite a police officer’s threatening to arrest all three occupants of a car unless
someone confessed to possessing drugs and money found in the passenger compartment, the Court
ignored the Fifth Amendment compulsion argument in its opinion); Brief of Respondent at 31–34,
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003) (No. 02-809) (arguing that the officer’s threatening to arrest
Pringle and two other individuals if someone did not confess to possessing the drugs found in the car
constituted “compulsion” for Pringle to be a witness against himself, in violation of the Fifth
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination).
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protection at all).67 This method virtually eliminates any privacy protections
while on the street, permitting constitutionally unrestricted governmental video
surveillance, governmental monitoring of conversations between friends or
lovers, and electronic tracking of cars because all occur in “public.”68 But other
concepts of privacy treat it, unlike the Court, not as an either–or commodity but
as a thing of varying degrees in which we are each free justifiably to care about
who sees us, for what purposes, for how long, in what manner.69 Under that
concept, the Fourth Amendment would apply limited privacy protections even
in “public,” an oxymoronic idea for the Court.70
A particularly important finding of the Court is that the Fourth Amendment
has no application to subpoenas that are not unduly vague.71 Combined with the
Court’s narrow notion of reasonable privacy protections, this rule allows the
state to obtain nearly unlimited information from third parties via subpoena in
a world in which it is nearly impossible to avoid third parties having access to
much information about individuals.72 Thus Internet-service providers, on-line
businesses, and even the banks in which we have personal accounts can be
compelled via subpoena to reveal extraordinarily detailed information about us
without Fourth Amendment regulation, thus without proving probable cause or
meeting any lesser burden.73
When the Court does find that the Fourth Amendment governs, it often
turns primarily to two other tests: (a) reasonable suspicion, or (b) no suspicion
at all.
B. Reasonable Suspicion
Reasonable suspicion is not only lower in quantity, but may be based on
lower-quality evidence than is probable cause.74 Furthermore, reasonable
suspicion has been subject to the same devolution as probable cause, that is,
relying on ever greater generalizations despite purported commitment to
individualized justice, turning on even poorer quality evidence than previously
permitted, and being established on less quantitative proof than was true in the

67. See HENNING ET AL., supra note 13, at 26–36 (surveying many situations where the Court
found no reasonable expectation of privacy); Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher,
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at
“Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 733–39, 759–61 (1993)
(empirical study finding Americans’ actual expectations of privacy depart widely from the Court’s
judgment of what expectations are reasonable).
68. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology,
Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 133–41 (Spring 2002).
69. See id. at 140 (“Privacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all.”).
70. See id. at 141–43.
71. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444–46 (1976).
72. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 60, at 152–54.
73. See id.
74. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); HENNING ET AL., supra note 13, at 98–100.
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past.75 Reasonable suspicion now has an extraordinarily wide scope, permitting
street stop-and-frisks for investigative purposes, full-blown searches of students’
purses, and roving searches of probationers’ and parolees’ homes (despite the
purported “sacred” status of the home under the Fourth Amendment).76
The Court has recently, albeit in dicta, even revived the idea that
“investigative warrants” based solely upon reasonable suspicion to arrest
someone for fingerprinting, DNA samples, and the like, may be
constitutional—again despite seemingly unequivocal Fourth Amendment
language declaring that “no warrants” shall issue that are not based upon
probable cause.77 The Court has also begun using reasonable suspicion to mount
a rear-guard attack on what evidence may be used to establish probable cause
by narrowing the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Most
notably, in the recent Hiibel case,78 police stopped a car driven by Mr. Hiibel,
with Hiibel’s daughter in the passenger seat, based upon reasonable suspicion
that a man driving a car of a similar description had been hitting a woman
passenger. When Hiibel repeatedly refused to reveal his name to the officer
unless the officer would explain why he had been stopped, the officer arrested
Hiibel for violating a criminal statute mandating name-revelation to the officer.
The Court, in a 5–4 decision, found no violation of the privilege in compelling
Hiibel to give his name upon pain of arrest and criminal prosecution. Unwanted
revelation of a name may seem a small matter, but it had large implications, as
the dissenters angrily pointed out.79 The Court had previously repeatedly
justified Terry investigative stops on mere reasonable suspicion partly on the
grounds that such stops were relatively nonintrusive because persons
questioned during such stops had no obligation to answer.80 But here the Court
majority permitted reasonable suspicion to justify compelled responses to
75. David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric
Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 975, 976–77 (1998).
76. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006) (concluding that parolees have even fewer
expectations of privacy than probationers); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (approving
warrantless search of probationer’s home upon an officer’s developing reasonable suspicion that the
probationer had engaged in a crime unrelated to the offense of conviction); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 878 (1987) (“We think that the probation regime would . . . be unduly disrupted by a
requirement of probable cause.”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (discussing student
searches); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1968) (discussing the “reasonableness” requirement for a
stop-and-frisk search); HENNING ET AL., supra note 13, at 41–59.
77. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815 (1985); see also United States v. Askew, 529 F.3d 1119,
1139–40 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (describing statement in Hayes as dicta); accord Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626,
631 (citing the Hayes dicta with approval).
78. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
79. See id. at 193–96 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 198–99 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
80. Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring) (“Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to
answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although
it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation.”). See also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S.
119, 125 (2000) (explaining that allowing officers to stop and question a fleeing person under Terry is
“quite consistent with the individual’s right to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in
the face of police questioning”); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (adopting for the full
Court language strikingly similar to that in White’s Terry concurrence).
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questions during such a stop, then further permitting silence in the face of those
questions to bootstrap reasonable suspicion into probable cause for arrest,
hardly a minor inconvenience.
C. No Suspicion
The Court has similarly widely expanded the number of situations in which
no level of suspicion is required whatsoever. This occurs primarily in connection
with “administrative” searches and seizures but has a huge scope, including
drunk-driving roadblocks, automobile-inventory searches, random drug testing
of safety-sensitive personnel and of high-school students involved in
extracurricular activities (including even the chess team), automobile-parts-lot
searches, and Occupational Safety and Health Administration searches, among
numerous others.81 Even searches or seizures having the clear purpose of
imposing criminal punishment are often characterized as administrative
because, in the Court’s view, their “primary” objective, programmatic purpose
is administrative.82
III
WHAT MAKES THIS SYMPOSIUM UNIQUE AND IMPORTANT
Pieces of the probable-cause story told above have been written about by
many authors, though sometimes in only a small portion of an article or book
chapter. But no one has examined as a comprehensive, systematic phenomenon
the erosion (or, if you approve of the law’s direction, the mutation) of the
probable-cause concept. This symposium examines the causes, the actual and
potential consequences, and the moral, political, and psychological wisdom of
the neo-probable cause era. Accordingly, the symposium crosses disciplinary
boundaries, looking at history, social science, neuroscience, and philosophy, as
well as at more-common legal sources, to answer the questions posed.
When, if ever, may the probable cause “requirement” be jettisoned and, if it
is, what should replace it? Professor Christopher Slobogin’s contribution,
Government Dragnets, addresses these questions. Slobogin defines
“government dragnets” as group-based searches.83 These searches include
health-and-safety inspections, roadblocks, group DNA-swabbing, certain
pretextual searches, public video surveillance, airport searches, and datasurveillance. By their very nature group searches cannot be justified by
“individualized” suspicion, if they can be justified at all.
Slobogin builds on political-process theory to argue that group searches
should generally be permissible outside of such core protected areas as arrests

81. See HENNING ET AL., supra note 13, at 180 (“[T]he balance in administrative search or seizure
cases is found to favor suspicionless, warrantless searches or seizures.”). See generally id. at 179–202
(describing the myriad circumstances in which the Court has upheld such searches).
82. See id. at 179–83.
83. Slobogin, supra note 41.
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and full-blown home searches if authorized by clear, specific legislation. Groupprocess theory argues that elected representatives who permit abusive
legislation will face the wrath of the electorate. Moreover, the representative
nature of the electorate ensures that the voices of those regulated will be heard,
giving them a say in the regulatory process. Accordingly, such regulation merits
deference, and any resulting searches are therefore “reasonable” under the
Fourth Amendment. Group searches authorized by legislation that leaves
undue discretion in the hands of the executive or that is engaged in absent any
authorizing legislation whatsoever would, however, be subject to strict scrutiny.
This strict-scrutiny test would turn on principles of proportionality and
exigency, and Slobogin illustrates the ways in which these principles would
apply given concerns unique to the area of group searches, for example,
considering the relevance of search “hit rates.”
Craig Bradley’s piece, Reconceiving the Fourth Amendment and the
Exclusionary Rule,84 is less concerned with probable cause than with the
consequences of its absence, specifically, the exclusion of evidence at trial.
Bradley argues that the exclusionary rule should be applied only when the
police acted unreasonably (negligently) in their understanding or application of
existing Fourth Amendment doctrine. The consequence of his approach would
be to change outcomes from the current status quo in three primary
circumstances: first, when the police relied on clear precedent that the United
States Supreme Court changes; second, when the police relied on a reasonable
interpretation of ambiguous precedent; and third, when the police reasonably
misunderstood the nature of the facts supporting probable cause. In none of
these instances would Bradley counsel suppression. Although Bradley relies on
a variety of sources to support his argument, his piece is a primarily
comparative one, finding wisdom in portions of the varied approaches to the
exclusionary rule in Canada, England, Wales, Germany, and France.
Historian Thomas Davies’ piece, How the Post-Framing Adoption of the
Bare-Probable-Cause Standard Drastically Expanded Government Arrest and
Search Power,85 argues that the modern idea of what he calls “bare probable
cause” is in fact far less protective of liberty than the earlier idea that, in
addition to probable cause, most searches and arrests also required a sworn
statement by a potentially accountable victim that a crime had “in fact”
occurred. This standard had its roots in due process, not the Fourth
Amendment. The bare-probable-cause standard arose in the context of customs
inspections, probably because there was no single “victim” or “complainant” on
whom to rely in such cases. The Fourth Amendment sought to prohibit the
general warrants for customs searches that the colonists so despised, thus
embracing the alternative, individualized probable-cause standard. But the
Framers avoided requiring more than probable cause because they knew that

84. 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211 (Summer 2010).
85. 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Summer 2010).
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the new federal government would have to rely substantially on customs
searches for revenue. Only in the mid–eighteenth century did the migration of
the bare-probable-cause standard to ordinary criminal cases begin, a process
that reached something resembling current understandings only during the
Prohibition Era. Carefully tracing the Framing and Post-Framing history with
great detail, Davies concludes that only an almost willful misreading of history
can explain the dominance of bare probable cause when more-muscular
protections once ruled. Yet the modern Court has, in Davies’ view,
unacceptably diluted even the minimal protections of bare probable cause as
well.
Sherry Colb, in her piece, Probabilities in Probable Cause and Beyond:
Statistical Versus Concrete Harms,86 examines the logic and psychology of how
we react to abstract, statistical descriptions of harm versus concrete instances of
harm. For example, if an officer finds two people in a house, both of whom live
there, and finds cocaine somewhere in that house, he might announce that he
will arrest both persons if one does not confess to possessing the cocaine.
Assuming that only one of the two possesses it, and assuming that the officer is
aware of this fact, he will know with absolute certainty that one of these two
people is innocent of the crime. Nevertheless, when neither confesses, he arrests
both. Being confronted with the arrest of a concrete, flesh-and-blood individual
whom we know to be innocent intuitively affronts us, argues Colb. Yet we are
intuitively less-disturbed by the officer’s arresting a single individual because we
conclude that there is a fifty-percent likelihood of his guilt based upon some
formula (perhaps a profile). Such reactions, Colb maintains, occur in a wide
variety of instances relevant to search and seizure, including the reaction to
exclusion as a remedy. Colb explores the moral wisdom and logic of this
distinction, including by comparing its role in other areas of law, such as
disparate-impact litigation, death-penalty cases, and ordinary tort suits. Colb
finds virtues and vices in the distinction, finding them difficult to balance, and
thus reaches only the tentative conclusion that, in the context of probable cause,
the distinction is neither moral nor rational.
Andrew Taslitz’s contribution, What is Probable Cause, and Why Should We
Care?: The Costs, Benefits, and Meaning of Individualized Suspicion,87 in part
stands in contrast to Colb’s (and Slobogin’s) apparently ready embrace of the
role of generalizations in the probable-cause determination. Taslitz begins by
engaging with philosophers who argue that there is little, if any, logical or
practical difference between “individualized” and “generalized” suspicion.
Taslitz argues that there is a real logical distinction, while conceding that the
terms lie on a spectrum rather than being dichotomous. He also finds practical
distinctions between the two concepts in accounting for the problems of
uncontrolled police discretion and imperfect police knowledge. Having

86. 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 (Summer 2010).
87. Taslitz, supra note 40.
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established the reality of the “individualized suspicion” concept, which Taslitz
sees as being at the heart of the probable-cause idea, he turns to cataloguing in
great detail its social benefits and costs.
Its benefits include promoting procedural fairness, including voice and
choice, which in turn heightens law’s legitimacy and acceptance; encouraging
transparency and impartiality; fostering distributive fairness, including equity
and equality; promoting appropriate retribution for governmental wrongdoing;
protecting privacy and its cousins; promoting dissent and diversity; paying
homage to the drive to be understood as a unique person worthy of being
treated with a measure of mystery and awe; and, particularly when
generalizations might be spurious ones, promoting accuracy. Its potential costs
include some of the guilty escaping justice; weakened general and specific
deterrence; justice delayed; heightened out-of-pocket and opportunity costs; a
narrowed scope of Fourth Amendment application; and impracticality as a
standard when only group suspicion is feasible to further certain state goals.
Taslitz relies on social science and normative philosophy to define these various
benefits and costs and to illustrate their application. His goal is not to insist that
probable cause be inflexibly required nor to permit its being readily dismissed.
Rather, Taslitz argues that truly understanding probable cause’s meaning and
carefully parsing its costs and benefits better enable decisionmakers to decide
when it must be retained, when not, and, if jettisoned under particular
circumstances, what alternative safeguards can fill the social void left by
probable cause’s absence. Taslitz concludes by illustrating how this more careful
approach to constitutional balancing would operate in several paradigm cases.

